This was a wild ride.
Command and Control : Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety goes into considerable detail on the cultural and institutional intransigence regarding safety that the American nuclear weapons establishment suffered through at least the 1970s. It will not give you any warm fuzzies about the mere day-to-day reality of managing and handling nuclear weapons, to say nothing of the prospect of a hot war involving the exchange of megatons.
We (and the Soviets/Russians) have had “broken arrows,” and I am sure there were more both sides have not admitted.
If I was working Intelligence and think I intercepted unencrypted all-zero nuclear codes, my first suspicion would be that it was a decoy.
LOL!
“We could DDOS them…”
No… that’s not how DDOS works…
I just love it when language adopts a phrase, and future users forget that it has meaning, and start using it improperly. “Literally”. I’m wondering when dictionaries will start changing the definition of “literally” from “literally” to “figuratively”, being that the usage of the phrase to mean “figuratively” has become more common than using it to mean “literally”.
I think “to ddos them” sounds better than “to dos them” and dos has other meanings
“Sounds better” != right (and makes you look a fool)
There are reasons one should be hesitant to use the phrase “dos” (or any undefined acronym/initialism) in verbal communication, and the ambiguous meaning is one.
I thought you would like that … gotta love Stephen Fry … brilliant man
I have an almost impossible time believing this, but still entertain the idea that it was possible.
The launch codes were rotated regularly, transmitted by courier not wire, and held by crews underground and the POTUS’ football detail.
My former boss was a Launch Officer at a silo in Tucson (there were 18 silos in the area, and one is now a historical site).
I can check with him if you really want to know, but I seriously don’t think you even need to ask.